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Welcome to ComplianceAsia News

We aim to offer all of the latest developments we think are relevant to compliance professionals dealing with issues in financial regulation with a focus on the Asian region. Many of the articles are from the  the US and the UK because these are the principal locations that effect how firms operate in Asia outside of the regulator that is closest to your Asian operation.

Thursday
Jul292010

Webb on exchanges in Hong Kong

We do not always agree with David Webb, an financial policy activist in Hong Kong, but he makes some very interesting points in his current article on the monopoly that the Hong Kong Stock Exchange enjoys in Hong Kong.  See here for details.

 

Wednesday
Jul142010

Mr Mok Kee Tong short selling fine

On 8 July the FSC reported that Mr Mok Kee Tong, a licensed representative of Lehin Securities Limited, had been fined $54,000 after pleading guilty to 18 charges of illegally short selling. Mok was also instructed to pay the SFC investigation costs.

The SFC’s reported that its investigation found that between 3 September 2009 and 11 December 2009, Mok conducted intraday short selling involving 14 stocks traded on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited when he did not have a presently exercisable and unconditional right to sell them and did not believe or have reasonable grounds to believe that he had such right (thus constituting illegal short selling). Mok made a profit on each of the short selling occasions.

For further information please see Short Selling Fine

Wednesday
Jul142010

SFC bans and fines Ricky Kwan Po Kit 

On 5 July the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) reported that it had banned Mr Ricky Kwan Po Kit, from re-entering the industry for five years from 2 July 2010 to 1 July 2015 and fined him $228,000.

The SFC found that Kwan operated a secret account in his brother-in-law’s name without proper disclosure to his employer, with some transactions generating a profit. In doing so, he placed himself in a position of serious conflict in breach of the General Principle 6 (conflicts of interest) of the Code of Conduct.

 

For further information please see Kwan Banned

Monday
Jul052010

SFC applies takeover-and-merger framework to REITs 

On 25 June The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) released to press releases in relation to the application of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases (Codes) to SFC-authorised real estate investment trusts (REITs).

The conclusions from the consultation process undertaken in January were also released on 25 June. Consultation Conclusions

Mr Martin Wheatley, the SFC's Chief Executive Officer, said "We believe that the implementation of the proposals represent a significant step forward in establishing a regulatory framework that better protects the investors’ interests and assists the further development of the REIT market in Hong Kong"

The proposed amendments to the Code on REITs (REIT Code) and the Codes include aligning the control structure of REITs with that of listed companies and introducing a set of REIT Guidance Notes. The amendments took effect from Friday, 25 June 2010.

The second release was in relation to amendments to the Codes in relation to pre-vetting of certain takeovers-related matters. The SFC announced that certain routine takeovers-related announcements will no longer be required to be submitted to the Executive (Note 1) for comment prior to publication.

For further information please see Post-Vetting Requirement

Thursday
Jun102010

MAS issues Tenets of Effective Regulation

 

On 8 June 2010, The MAS issued a monograph “Tenets of Effective Regulation”. The guide lays out out how MAS designs and formulates regulation, and explains its regulatory approach. The six Tenets are:

Tenet 1: Outcome Focused
Tenet 2: Shared Responsibility
Tenet 3: Risk Appropriate
Tenet 4: Responsive to Change and Cycles
Tenet 5: Impact Sensitive
Tenet 6: Clear and Consistent

Teo Swee Lian, Deputy Managing Director, MAS, said, “Success in achieving effective regulation requires more than MAS setting demanding standards of itself. Industry has a critical role to play by taking shared responsibility for and ownership of the regulatory objectives, as well as instituting high standards of governance and controls for itself.  Articulating this set of Tenets is a further step towards fostering shared understanding and ownership of our regulatory approach and objectives.”

The monograph on "Tenets of Effective Regulation" is available on MAS’ website.

 

 

 

 

 

Wednesday
Jun092010

One more thing before I go

As most followers of the US political system know, long time Democratic Senator Chris Dodd is soon retiring.  A major legacy for the financial industry will be the passage of a large number of financial reforms that we have been covering in this blog since President Obama was elected.

Leading US law firm, K&L Gates, has posted a very good summary of the current status of the Dodd Bill, the House Bill that was similar and the conference proceedings which begin any day now.

In short the Obama Financial Reforms should be signed into law by early July.

The reforms will bring a lot of change in areas like bank regulation, OTC derivatives, US registration of hedge funds and other private pools of capital, credit agencies and the sale of financial products to consumers.  Each change is actually quite significant and as a group they certainly are the biggest changes to US financial services since the 1930's.

With such considerable change and new rules across multiple types of business models it is all going to take a while to digest.  Indeed as K&L Gates point out, you should expect further legislative amendments and clarifications to as the provisions begin to be tried in real life.

A few wags referred to the Sarbanes Oxley legislation as the Accounting and Audit Remuneration Act and the Dodd Bill is certainly the Legal and Compliance Providers Remuneration Act of 2010.

We expect to see a decent volume of work in 2011 arising from the requirement for overseas managers of hedge funds to be registered with the US SEC and to remain compliant with it rules and directives. 

We also expect broad international acceptance of many of the US banking, OTC, consumer protection and credit reference agency changes to result in corresponding changes at the local level in the major Asian jurisdictions of Japan, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore.  Hong Kong recently announced it is issuing new guideance for credit reference agencies and it has been quite active over the last 12 months in the area of rule changes for firms selling financial products to the public.  Singapore has of course made similar progess in the area of the sale of financial products and it is expected to soon require all previously exempt asset managers to be licensed by the MAS.

The costs of new provisions across multiple jurisdictions will be high.  This against a backdrop of sub-optimal economic growth in the US and Europe and challenging markets for asset managers and intermediaries in the Asian region.  It is fair to say that this is likely to mean that the industry will be smaller overall.  The larger players will find a way to meet the new requirements - even if it means splitting off parts of their business - while the ones who have been marginal to this point simply won't have the capital to go on.  Mr Dodd may not be the only one retiring soon.

 

Thursday
Jun032010

Malaysia SC amends Guidelines on Unit Trust Funds

On June 1, 2010, the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) announced that it had amended the Guidelines on Unit Trust Funds (GUTF) to facilitate a multi-class structure for unit trust funds. The amendments allow for a single unit trust fund to offer multiple classes of units over a single investment pool, with each class of units having different features such as the fees and charges imposed and the currency in which it is denominated.

 

As such, investors will be able to choose the class that best suit their preferences and investment objectives enabling better matching of the investment preferences for different investor groups. 

For more information please see SC amendments to GUTF

Wednesday
Jun022010

SFC fine UBS employees

Continuing a very busy couple of weeks of fines and enforcement reporting the Hong Kong SFC today announced that it was fining three UBS employees in connection with an issue that was previously covered in this blog involving wash trades and a client of Morgan Stanley.

The SFC reported as follows:

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has publicly reprimanded Mr Frank Hu, Ms Peony Ng and Ms Jenny Chang Pui Chun of UBS AG Hong Kong (UBS) and fined them $800,000, $600,000 and $400,000 respectively, for negligence in handling a client’s trade orders (Note 1).

An SFC investigation found that Hu, Ng, and Chang, were negligent in relation to a series of trades that they carried out on behalf of one of their clients at UBS which constituted wash sales and may have misled the market (Note 2).

Both Hu and Ng are executive directors at UBS and Chang is an associate director.

In February 2008, the client, who was facing margin calls from UBS decided to transfer part of his portfolio at UBS (Note 3) to his account at Morgan Stanley Asia Ltd (Morgan Stanley) in order to ease his margin position with UBS.

This could have been achieved through a simple delivery versus payment arrangement, such as by using the Central Clearing and Settlement System. Instead, a series of on-exchange matched sales and purchases (Note 4) was coordinated among Hu, Ng and Chang at UBS and the client’s account executive and her assistants at Morgan Stanley (Note 5) between 28 February and 26 March 2008.

In deciding the penalty for Hu, Ng and Chang, the SFC took into account that the three individuals had not carried out the matched trades with manipulative intent to interfere with the market, that they had sought internal compliance advice at UBS but failed to follow the advice due to misunderstanding, that they had co-operated with the SFC, and that each of them has a clean disciplinary record.

End

Notes:

1. Hu, Ng and Chang are relevant individuals registered with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Hu and Chang are authorized to carry out Type 1 (dealing in securities) and Type 4 (advising on securities) regulated activities whilst Ng is authorized to carry out Type 1 regulated activities.
2. Wash sales are transactions that do not involve any change in beneficial ownership. In this case, the sell orders of UBS and the buy orders of Morgan Stanley were matched on 82 occasions where there was no change in beneficial ownership of the shares involved.
3. The securities involved in the transfer were Fosun International Ltd (stock code 656), Tiangong International Company Ltd (stock code 826), Centron Telecom International Holding Ltd (stock code 1155), and Kingsoft Corporation Ltd (stock code 3888).
4. Upon receiving the client’s instructions, Chang would input sell orders on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. She would then inform the account executives handling the client’s account at Morgan Stanley by telephone immediately of the volume and price of the orders who would then arrange for Morgan Stanley, on behalf of the client, to purchase from the market similar quantity of the same stock at the same prices or at prices lower than UBS’ sell orders.
5. The SFC has also taken disciplinary action against the account executive at Morgan Stanley (See SFC press release
dated 17 August 2009).

Monday
May312010

SFC fine Merrill Lynch

According to the SFC website, the Hong Kong SFC has fined two Merrill Lynch entities at total of HK$3.5m (about US450k) for internal control breaches.

Here is the report:

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has fined Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Limited and Merrill Lynch Futures (Hong Kong) Limited (collectively Merrill Lynch) (Note 1) $3,500,000 for systems and controls failings associated with the mis-marking activities in a trading book.

The SFC’s investigation found that during the period from December 2007 to October 2008, a managing director of Merrill Lynch had mis-marked a trading book in exotics options (Book) by manipulating the volatility marks in the valuation model, and accessed the computer system without authority to alter pricing parameters on various occasions. The mis-marking activities, which did not apply to any other books, resulted in the value of the Book being inflated by approximately US$25 million and caused the actual loss in the Book to be wrongly reported internally.

The SFC found that Merrill Lynch did not have adequate internal controls procedures in place to manage the risks associated with mis-marking, in that:

  • there was uncertainty as to supervisory responsibilities over the trader and the Book;
  • the price verification mechanism applied to other trading books was not applied to the Book;
  • there were inadequate checks and balances over the Book to mitigate operation risks including risks associated with fraud and dishonest activities;
  • there was insufficient safeguard over information security and integrity as regards the Book;
  • trading and valuation policies were not sufficiently implemented over the Book; and
  • senior management failed to adequately manage the risks associated with the Book.


“Licensed corporations must have effective procedures in place to manage risks of trading books. For books that deal in illiquid assets which have low price transparency, more robust measures must be in place. The proper implementation of an effective risk management framework could have enabled Merrill Lynch to detect the mis-marking earlier,” said Mr Mark Steward, the SFC’s Executive Director of Enforcement.

Merrill Lynch accepts that its systems and controls fell short of those expected in respect of the Book.

The SFC accepts that Merrill Lynch’s misconduct was not intentional and Merrill Lynch has taken remedial steps to address the compliance weaknesses. In deciding on the sanctions, the SFC took into account Merrill Lynch’s co-operation in resolving the case.

End

Notes:

1. Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Limited is licensed under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) to carry on Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 4 (advising on securities), Type 6 (advising on corporate finance) and Type 7 (providing automated trading services) regulated activities. Merrill Lynch Futures (Hong Kong) Limited is licensed to carry on Type 2 (dealing in futures contracts) regulated activity under the SFO.
๏ปฟ

Tuesday
May252010

MAS issues consultation paper on Code of Collective Investment Schemes

On May 17, the MAS issued a consultation paper on the Code of Collective Investment Schemes. The paper focuses on investment guidelines and on ensuring that the regulatory regime for CIS keeps pace with product innovation and industry developments, as well as regulatory developments in major fund jurisdictions.

The proposed amendments include:

  1. Introducing a list of permissible investments and accompanying criteria to enhance clarity in the application of the liquidity and diversification limits
  2. Strengthening safeguards on the use of financial derivatives through prescription of counterparty limits and acceptable forms of collateral used to mitigate counterparty risks. 
  3. Introducing additional guidelines on the use of the commitment approach and Value-at-Risk (VaR) method.
  4. Enhancing existing guidelines on funds’ securities lending activities through comprehensive requirements on the counterparty, custodian and the use of collateral.
  5. Establishing new investment guidelines for funds seeking to track indices, introducing principles for the naming of funds and requirements to standardise the methods used for calculating performance fees. 
  6. Modifying existing operational requirements, including allowing the sending of accounts and annual reports to unitholders by electronic means.

Comments are due to MAS by 25 June 2010.

 

For further information please use the following link CIS Consultation Paper

Friday
May142010

HK SFC again takes action in relation to an employee's secret account

The Hong Kong SFC has taken action again in relation to a licensed person not disclosing a personal share dealing account of a relative.

Details on the SFC website were as follows:

SFC suspends Mak Kan Long

 

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has suspended the licence of Mr Mak Kan Long for four months from 6 May 2010 to 5 September 2010 (Note 1).

The disciplinary action follows an SFC investigation which found that from April 2008 to March 2009, Mak had:

• failed to disclose his wife’s account to his employer as a staff-related account;

• conducted discretionary trading for his wife in that account without his wife’s written authorization or disclosing the discretionary authority to his employer; and

• failed to keep an audit trail of order instructions given by his wife.

In determining the penalty, the SFC took into account all circumstances, including Mak’s clear disciplinary record and his application for transfer of his licence accreditation was held up because of the SFC’s investigation.

The SFC will continue to take action against licensees who do not disclose secret accounts.


End


Note:

1. Mak was licensed to carry on Type 1 (dealing in securities) regulated activity under the Securities and Futures Ordinance and was accredited to Core Pacific-Yamaichi Securities (HK) Ltd and Core Pacific-Yamaichi International (HK) Ltd at the material time. He is currently not accredited to any licensed corporation.
Thursday
May132010

Martin Wheatley comments on regulatory issues at the Fix Conference

Martin Wheatley, CEO of the Hong Kong SFC, spoke today at the Fix Conference in Hong Kong.  Mr Wheatley covered a variety of issues including those relating to last week's trading glitch on the US exchanges and he highlighted four issues that were receiving regulatory attention in Hong Kong.

The first two, the licensing of credit ratings agencies and additional reporting for hedge funds, were projects already underway at the SFC.  Credit ratings agencies would have to apply to be licensed in Hong Kong and new circulars would be issued to give them guidance as to how they would deal with the conflicts of interest created by their business methods.  Martin did not give a specific time for the annoucement.

Recently IOSCO published guidance for regulators on information that they should seek from hedge funds operating in their jurisdiction.  Martin said that the SFC would soon begin collecting additional information from hedge funds.  While Martin did not give any timing, we know from some events we have recently attended with Stephen Po, the Director of Supervision, that the survey will come out soon so that an IOSCO deadline of October can be met.  Mr Po has discussed the new requirement at a couple of functions that he has recently attended.

Mr Wheatley went onto say that there were two open issues that the Commission was looking at closely that had not yet become policy in Hong Kong and they were the Volcker rule and new rules regarding standardisation and exchange trading of OTC products.  These are apparently issues that the Hong Kong SFC is carefully monitoring to consider whether they should become policy if those issues proceed in the US.

Otherwise the conference went well.  Yours truly spoke on a panel on regional regulation issues.

Wednesday
May122010

Another MAS Corporate Governance Speech

On 10 May, Senior Minister Goh Chock Tong of MAS gave a speech at the Singapore Corporate Awards. The focus of the speech was on good corporate governance, which continues the trend of MAS this year to emphasise this to the business community.

Highlights from the speech included the relationship between good corporate governance and fiscal responsibility; corporate governance and competitiveness; and the role that the MAS Corporate Governance Council would play in order to ensure Singapore’s international leadership in corporate governance.

Mr Goh focused on substance over form, emphasising that not only must businesses comply with regulatory rules and requirements, but also they must understand and enact the spirit and values behind the corporate governance principles. The board, through their leadership and skills must ensure that the culture within the business is such that there is balance between profitability and being good corporate citizens in the broader sense.

For the full text of the speech, please use the following link, Singapore Corporate Awards

Sunday
May092010

Market Manipulation Convictions for 2 warrant traders.

On 7 May the SFC reported that the District Court had found Mr Patrick Fu Kor Kuen and Mr Francis Lee Shu Yuen guilty of manipulating the market in various listed derivative warrants issued by Macquarie Bank Ltd (Macquarie Bank) between January 2004 and January 2005.

Fu and Lee were convicted in relation to 40 counts of market manipulation under section 295 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance.

The SFC alleged that Fu and Lee, through accounts at two brokerages, traded between themselves in a pre-determined manner in approximately the same quantities and prices in a repetitive fashion.

The trading was in effect not genuine trading, but a “ping pong” game with the result that the turnover for the Macquarie-issued warrants in question was falsely inflated by 80% or over $450 million in value. As a result, potential investors were misled into thinking these warrants were heavily traded by genuine buyers and sellers when in fact the reverse was the position.

The SFC also alleged Fu and Lee received commission rebates for their trading which was offered by Macquarie Equities (Asia) Ltd (Macquarie Equities). The commission rebate had the effect of reducing transaction costs for investors. The high volume of trading by Fu and Lee meant commission rebates they earned from Macquarie Equities exceeded the transaction costs they incurred in trading, enabling them to earn a net profit of approximately $1 million.

The District Court found that Fu and Lee traded to receive the commission rebates but they also did so to create the appearance of an active market as this would be to their advantage when they came to exit the market.

Wednesday
Apr282010

MAS releases consultation paper on changes to hedge fund manager regime in Singapore

In 2009, the Monetary Authority of Singapore or MAS consulted with industry about potential changes to the system of registering hedge fund managers and advisors in Singapore.  Singapore had a registration system where a firm dealt with less than 30 funds and both its clients and the investors in those funds were accredited investors, essentially high net worth or institutional.

This contrasted with the Hong Kong system which really did not distinguish between a large fund manager and a smaller startup.  Both firms needed licensing from the Hong Kong SFC prior to commencing business.

The 2009 consultations lead to a concern that the MAS may make substantial changes to the existing system that would result in a large number of closures of managers in Singapore.  However up until yesterday nothing had ever been formally published by the MAS and frankly all that was available to market participants was speculation and some educated guesswork.

Yesterday the MAS published its consultation paper and an appendix.

The proposed changes would result in a three tier system consisting of a continuation of the notification system for managers managing or advising less than SGD250m (approx USD182m) where they only have professionals in their funds, a licensing system for firms above that amount who deal with professionals and a third category for firms who wish to deal with retail, ie non high net worth, non institutional investors.

Depending on which of the three categories firms fall into they will have specific additional compliance requirements under the new proposed rules.

Later today a representative from the MAS is speaking at a seminar in Singapore organised by Clifford Chance.  It will be interesting to see whether anything more is discussed about the new proposals.

The consultation paper also deals with some other prospective changes to the regulatory environment in Singapore relating to leveraged forex and an exemption that is currently in force that will be removed.

Timing wise the roll out of the changes, if they are effected, is likely to take a little while as legislative changes will need to be passed.  Our best guess at present is that this is a 2011 roll out but we are sure to learn more over the next few weeks.

 

Tuesday
Apr272010

ICAC in Hong Kong obtains conviction of industry participants

The ICAC or Indepedent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong is the body that deals with issues regarding corruption in both the public and private sector.  They have a global reputation for firm and sucessful actions.  They also have consider powers of investigation.

Every now and then they go after persons in the financial industry and the result of one such case involving derivative warrants was published yesterday.  The announcement is below:

Duo guilty of fraud over trading of derivative warrants 26.04.10


Two persons, charged by the ICAC, were today (Monday) convicted at the District Court of their roles in fraudulent trading of derivative warrants.

Raymond Ng Chun-to, 42, operator of Hong Kong Investor Company Limited (HKICL), was found guilty of four counts of conspiracy to defraud, and one of doing an act tending and with intent to pervert the course of public justice, contrary to Common Law.

Co-defendant Polly Sun Chor-fun, 35, staff member of HKICL, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud.

Ng's associate Lam Leo Sze-hang, 30, who was also charged for his role in the case, had earlier pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy to defraud, while a similar charge against him was ordered to be left on court file.

Judge Douglas Yau Tak-hong will continue to deliver his verdict tomorrow. Ng, Sun and Lam were remanded in the custody of the Correctional Services Department.

The case arose from a corruption complaint in relation to the trading of derivative warrants. Subsequent ICAC enquiries revealed the above offences.

The court heard that at the time of the offences, Calyon Financial Products (Guernsey) Limited, Citigroup Global Markets Holdings Incorporation, Standard Bank PLC and Dresdner Bank AG were derivative warrant issuers.

Respectively, the four issuers appointed CLSA Limited, Citigroup Global Markets Asia Limited, Standard Securities Asia Limited and Taifook Securities Company Limited as their Liquidity Providers (LPs).

The LPs have a function of providing liquidity of derivative warrants in the market by continuously quoting to investors bid and ask prices to ensure that there is a source of derivative warrants for trading.

The court heard that between September 2005 and May 2008, Ng, Sun and Lam conspired with other persons to defraud the above LPs, and such companies, firms and persons as might be induced to trade in tens of derivative warrants issued by the four issuers concerned.

To materialise their scam, Ng set up various bases in Hong Kong and on the Mainland.

Ng, Sun and Lam conspired to create a false or misleading appearance of active trading in the afore-mentioned derivative warrants daily through a number of dummy accounts operated by people associated with Ng from those bases.

The trio dishonestly caused traders based in Hong Kong of Calyon S.A., Citigroup Global Markets Asia Limited, Standard Bank Asia Limited and Dresdner Kleinwort Securities (Asia) Limited to render favourable prices to be quoted to people connected with Ng for the said derivative warrants.

The court also heard that Ng had approached an immunised witness and asked him not to co-operate with the ICAC and to give false and misleading information.

The prosecution was today represented by prosecuting counsel Joseph Tse, SC, assisted by ICAC officers Kevin Cho and Ada Lau.

Tuesday
Apr272010

Hong Kong SFC increases its pressure on Tiger Asia

The Hong Kong SFC has been in the middle of an action against Tiger Asia (a hedge fund manager based in New York) where the SFC claims that Tiger's actions constituted insider dealing when it sold short while in possession of alleged inside information relating to a placement.

The SFC has now made further claims about additional placements and this is reproduced below.

The case is important as it deals with an area not previously targetted by the SFC and also would set several precedents regarding the mechanics of the action if it is successful.

It shows the continued focus on the Enforcement Division at the Commission on activities in the professionals market.

The SFC announcement was:

SFC seeks trading ban against Tiger Asia over alleged insider trading

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is seeking court orders to prohibit New York-based asset management company, Tiger Asia Management LLC (Tiger Asia), from dealing in all listed securities and derivatives in Hong Kong in the light of further insider trading allegations concerning the shares of another bank -- Bank of China Limited (BOC).

This is the first time the SFC has sought orders from a court to exclude any entity from trading in the Hong Kong market.

The SFC has also amended the current proceedings against Tiger Asia and three of its senior officers, Mr Bill Sung Kook Hwang, Mr Raymond Park and Mr William Tomita (collectively referred to as “the Tiger Asia parties”) to include the new allegations and is seeking to freeze an additional amount of up to $8.6 million of Tiger Asia’s assets, equivalent to the notional profit Tiger Asia has allegedly made in one of the new claims.

This is on top of the $29.9 million that the SFC has applied to freeze when it first commenced proceedings in August 2009 against the Tiger Asia parties in relation to dealings by Tiger Asia in the shares of China Construction Bank Corporation (CCB) on 6 January 2009 (Notes 1 and 2).

The SFC alleges that in the case concerning BOC shares:

  1. Tiger Asia was given advance notice and was invited to participate in two placements of BOC shares by UBS AG and Royal Bank of Scotland on 31 December 2008 and 13 January 2009 respectively;
  2. Tiger Asia was provided with details of both placements after being told and agreeing the information was confidential and price sensitive;
  3. Tiger Asia also agreed not to deal in BOC shares after receiving the information;
  4. Tiger Asia short sold 104 million BOC shares before the placement by UBS AG on 31 December 2008 making a notional profit of $8.6 million; and
  5. Tiger Asia sold 256 million BOC shares before the placement by Royal Bank of Scotland on 13 January 2009 (of which 251 million shares were short sales) making a notional loss of around $10 million.


The SFC contends that these transactions constitute illegal insider trading in shares of BOC.

These allegations will be heard by the court in the same proceedings involving similar allegations against the Tiger Asia parties involving dealings in shares of CCB, at a date yet to be fixed.

In addition, the SFC is also seeking orders to unwind the transactions if the court finds they contravened the Securities and Futures Ordinance and to restore affected counterparties to their pre-transaction positions. The amount of assets that the SFC is seeking to freeze is to ensure there are sufficient funds to satisfy any restoration orders that may be made by the court.

End

Notes:

  1. Please see SFC press release dated 20 August 2009.
  2. The proceedings were commenced under section 213 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Tiger Asia was founded in 2001 and is a New York-based asset management company that specialises in equity investments in China, Japan and Korea. All of its employees are located in New York. Tiger Asia has no physical presence in Hong Kong. Park joined Tiger Asia in April 2006 and, at all times since, his job title has been Managing Director, Head of Trading, and his responsibilities include managing the trading desk, supervising orders and managing broker relationships. Tomita joined Tiger Asia in April 2008 and is charged with supporting the trading activities led by Park. Both Park and Tomita report to portfolio manager, Hwang, whom the SFC alleges made the trading decisions for the CCB and BOC trades. BOC has been listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited since 1 June 2006.
Monday
Apr262010

SFC in Hong Kong set to regulate all structured products

The Hong Kong SFC is moving to regulate all structured products by moving the requirements to register a prospectus from the current Companies Ordinance to the Securities and Futures Ordinance.  There are also other changes in the works regarding the definition of professional investors.  The proposed changes can be found in an SFC consultation paper set of conclusions.

The SFC notice is below:

In a set of consultation conclusions released today, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) announced that it will proceed with the proposal to transfer the regulation of public offers of structured products from the Companies Ordinance (CO) prospectus regime to the offers of investments regime in Part IV of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) (Note 1).

The transfer will enable public offers of all unlisted structured products (regardless of their legal form) to be regulated under the SFO. The SFC will publish codes and guidelines for the industry, setting out its regulatory policy on such products (Note 2). Meanwhile, the existing practice for traditional banking products and listed structured products will remain unchanged. The SFC further recommended to include as “securities” retail structured products not in the form of securities, instead of classifying all structured products as “securities” as originally proposed.

“We believe the proposed transfer should be implemented with some adjustments to certain specific proposals," said Mr Martin Wheatley, the SFC's Chief Executive Officer. "By enhancing disclosure and improving product transparency of unlisted structured products under the new Code on Unlisted Structured Investment Products, the existing regulatory regime for retail structured products will be enhanced.”

The SFC received 13 written submissions, mainly from market participants and professional bodies, for its consultation (Note 3) launched on 30 October 2009. Respondents generally supported the proposed transfer with comments on some of the specific proposals.

Friday
Apr232010

OTC regulation speech from Treasury

As President Obama executed a little bit of theatre close to Wall Street yesterday as he delivered a pitch on his financial reform (taxation and regulation) bill, Deptuty Secretary of the Treasury Neal Wolin made some interesting remarks to the ISDA annual meeting.  They are reproduced below and talk of the need for centralised clearing and margining with a narrow exemption for end users.

The big issues involved here have been in front of the public since the financial crisis but the legislation is now going through Washington processes that are most likely to result in over regulation and additional cost.  Haste will make waste on this one, just remember Sarbanes Oxley.


Thank you very much, Eraj, for that kind introduction.  Good morning and thank you all for the opportunity to be here today.

Over a year ago, in the midst of the worst financial panic since the Great Depression, President Obama gathered with Congressional leaders of both parties to discuss the urgent need for financial reform.

He said at that meeting, "The choice we face is not between some oppressive government-run economy or a chaotic and unforgiving capitalism.  Rather, strong financial markets require clear rules of the road, not to hinder financial institutions, but to protect consumers and investors, and ultimately to keep those financial institutions strong.  Not to stifle, but to advance competition, growth and prosperity.  And not just to manage crises, but to prevent crises from happening in the first place, by restoring accountability, transparency and trust in our financial markets."

A few months later, the Administration unveiled a sweeping set of reforms designed to do precisely what the President said: to lay the foundation for a safer, more stable financial system; one that fully protects the benefits of market-driven financial innovation while safeguarding against the dangers of instability and market-driven excess.

In putting forward these reforms, the Administration made a basic judgment: that we cannot let the memory of the crisis fade without taking action.  

We cannot afford to wait to establish stronger supervision for financial firms – especially for the largest, most interconnected;

To create an independent consumer financial protection agency to set and enforce clear rules of the road, so that consumers can make the choices that are right for them;

To protect taxpayers from risk of loss, by separating the business of banking from speculative proprietary trading;

To give us the tools to end the belief that any firm is "too big to fail";

And to bring transparency and oversight to key markets, including the over-the-counter derivatives market.

Each of these reforms is necessary and long overdue.  

Not surprisingly, I'd like to focus today on OTC derivatives – and to lay out what we believe is the clear, unambiguous case for reform of the OTC derivatives market.

The rapid growth and innovation in the markets for derivatives, especially OTC derivatives, has been one of the most significant financial developments of the last few decades.

These financial instruments have served and continue to serve an important purpose.  Used properly, they help businesses – from airlines to farmers to manufacturers – manage the risks that arise in the normal course of business.  And used properly, they help financial institutions better serve their clients and customers, making it easier for them to make markets and to extend credit.

But at the same time, the rapid growth in the use – and misuse – of derivatives has exposed our financial system to risks it was not prepared to bear.

These products grew up on the financial frontier without the basic protections and oversight that existed in most of the rest of the system.

Firms have been allowed to write massive amounts of credit protection without the capital to back it up.

Large parts of the OTC derivatives markets operate with no transparency – for regulators, for market participants, or for the public.

The SEC and CFTC have limited ability to police fraud and manipulation.

When the crisis hit in 2008, we paid a high price.  The panic was far more severe and far harder to manage because of these regulatory gaps and weaknesses.

Because derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS) were traded on a bilateral basis, few understood the magnitude of aggregate derivatives exposures in the system.

Risks embedded in AIG's $400 billion exposure to CDS, which brought that global institution to its knees and threatened to bring the financial system down with it, went unseen by the market and by regulators alike.

And the turmoil following Lehman's bankruptcy had much to do with uncertainty surrounding the exposure of Lehman's counterparties to the more than 900,000 derivatives positions Lehman held as of August, 2009.

Both Lehman and AIG highlight the opacity the OTC derivatives markets.  And like the collapse of Long Term Capital Management ten years before, both Lehman and AIG highlight the complex web of derivatives counterparty exposures that can entangle the entire financial system in times of crisis – and that makes it so dangerous when a large, interconnected firm goes down.

That is why a comprehensive, seamless, and tough framework for regulating over-the-counter derivatives is an essential element of financial reform, key to ending the problem of "too big to fail."

And that is why the Administration has said, loud and clear, that we will oppose efforts to weaken or undermine the strong regulatory framework that Senate Banking Committee Chairman Dodd put forward.

The derivatives bill passed out of the Senate Agriculture Committee yesterday under the leadership of Chairman Lincoln is also strong.  And we were encouraged to see a Republican Senator join with Democrats in moving forward on this issue.

We will continue to work with Chairman Dodd, Chairman Lincoln, and Senate leadership to make sure that the final derivatives provisions remain strong.

Under the provisions of both the Senate Banking and the Senate Agriculture Committee bills, there is a so called "end user exemption" that is narrow and focused.

But for any firm not covered by that narrow exemption, all standardized derivatives must be cleared through a central clearinghouse.

And all standardized derivatives trades must be executed on regulated exchanges or regulated electronic trading platforms.

There will be no barrier to using customized derivatives when customization is necessary and appropriate.

But all OTC derivative dealers and major swap participants will be strictly supervised, and will be required to maintain substantial capital buffers to back up their obligations.

Detailed information about all derivatives trades will be readily available to regulators.

And the CFTC and SEC will be given full authority to police these markets.

These reforms will help prevent market manipulation, fraud, and other abuses.

These reforms will help prevent the OTC derivative markets from threatening the stability of the financial system.

I know that many of you have concerns about some of these proposals.  So let me state the clear case for the proposals we have put forward.

Central clearing of standardized derivatives will substantially reduce the risk that arises from the complex web of bilateral derivatives exposures.  In its place, for standardized derivatives, there will be a simpler and safer hub and spoke relationship between traders and the clearinghouse.

And through careful supervision, capital requirements and regulation of the margining and other risk management practices of clearinghouses, we can ensure that clearinghouses are well protected against potential losses.

Of course, not every derivative contract can be cleared.  But many can.  Many more can be cleared than are being cleared today.  And to state it bluntly: the large OTC dealers simply do not have a sufficient incentive to speed up the process of standardization.  Large dealers profit too handsomely from the current system in which they have far more information and far more leverage than other market participants.

We have proposed a practical, reasonable method for identifying those derivatives that can and should be centrally cleared:

If a derivative contract is already accepted for clearing by one or more clearinghouses, and if it is approved by the CFTC and the SEC, it should be centrally cleared.  And at the same time, the CFTC and the SEC should have authority to proactively require central clearing of derivatives contracts that are sufficiently standardized and liquid or whose economic terms are substantially the same as contracts that are already centrally cleared.

This two-channel approach takes advantage of the expertise of private clearinghouses.  But it also protects the market from clearinghouses imprudently seeking new business, as well as from clearinghouses that might seek to preserve the OTC market for the benefit of their owners.

In addition to requiring standardized derivatives to be centrally cleared, we have also proposed – and both the Banking Committee and the Ag Committee bills include – a requirement that standardized derivatives be traded on exchanges or regulated electronic trading platforms.

The benefits of exchange trading are obvious.  Exchange trading improves transparency and price discovery – allowing end users, large and small, to judge more effectively whether and how to hedge their risks, and giving regulators and market participants important, real-time market insights.

We believe that a more standardized, more transparent, and more liquid market for derivatives will not only make the system safer – it will lower the costs for end users, borrowers and, ultimately, their customers.

And because customized products are often priced in relation to standard products, exchange trading of standardized derivatives will increase efficiency even in the customized, OTC market.

While clearing and exchange trading will ultimately make the derivatives market safer and more efficient for end users, there is an argument that the margining requirements would present some challenges for some end users.

That is why some have argued for a focused exemption from the clearing requirement for end users that are not dealers or major swap participants, that are predominantly engaged in non-financial activities, and that are hedging their real risks.

But any exemption must be drawn narrowly.  We cannot allow a reasonable exception to become an expansive loophole.

And to provide maximum transparency, we have proposed that even trades that are exempt from the central clearing requirement because of the end-user exemption nonetheless be reported on or through exchanges or electronic trading platforms.

The public reporting of price and volume information imposes no undue burdens, and makes the market as a whole more transparent, more efficient, and easier for regulators and market participants alike to monitor.

Now let me just reiterate one point: we have not proposed – and the Senate is not considering – a ban on customized derivatives.

We recognize that there is a legitimate and valuable role for customized derivatives traded in over-the-counter markets. Where managing a particular risk requires the use of a customized contract, we do not object to customization.

But to ensure that the market in customized products does not give rise to unmanaged risk, dealers and other major swap market participants must be subject to much higher prudential standards than they are today.

By imposing conservative capital and margin requirements on derivative dealers and major market participants, we will help ensure that no firm is able to take large, highly leveraged risks in the derivatives markets, without holding adequate capital.  Higher capital and margin requirements on customized OTC derivatives will also provide the market with incentives to move more derivatives onto exchanges.

And in addition, by requiring complete disclosure of all customized derivatives transactions, and putting in place a comprehensive reporting and record-keeping regime, we will ensure full regulatory visibility into the OTC market.

We cannot allow firms to build up massive positions with inadequate protection, beyond the scrutiny of supervisors. We cannot afford another AIG.

I know that, recently, ISDA has stated its commitment to taking some initial steps toward transparency, standardization and more effective collateral requirements.

We welcome those commitments.  But make no mistake: they are not enough. There can be no substitute for effective regulation and oversight of a market so large, so important and – still today – so un-supervised.

Derivatives should reduce risk, not magnify it.  They should be a force for stability, not panic.  With the right regulation and the right supervision, innovation in the derivatives markets will benefit every American business, large and small.

One last point before closing: as you in this room know better than anyone, the derivatives markets are global.  Fixing the gaps and weaknesses in the United States' regulatory system is necessary but not sufficient.  So as we work to make our own system stronger, we will continue to work internationally to ensure that our comprehensive regulatory regime for OTC derivatives is matched by a similarly effective regime abroad.

Indeed, this weekend Secretary Geithner is meeting with his G-20 counterparts to press the urgent case for reform, and to build on the strong consensus we have forged.

But we should not wait for others to act before fixing a broken system.  We must take the lead.  Failing to embrace change when change is clearly needed has never been the secret to America's success as a global financial center.

America's success has been based on stability, strength, liquidity, efficiency – and the smart regulation that makes all of those things possible.

Right now, back in Washington, the debate over financial reform is moving to the Senate floor.  The stakes could not be higher for the American people.  After more than a year of bipartisan discussion, after relentless consultation with experts and interest groups on every side of every issue, the time has come to act.

These reforms will force very consequential changes in these markets.  So it is no surprise that some are fighting to weaken the new framework.

But for the first time, there is a broad and unwavering consensus behind a comprehensive set of protections to make our derivatives markets more transparent, more efficient, more equitable, and more stable.

We must not miss this opportunity to build a stronger financial system.

Thursday
Apr222010

Singapore about to issue public consultation on asset management 

During 2009 there was a lot of talk about changes to the Singapore exempt asset management designation that had seen the creation of a vibrant community of some 500 hedge fund management and advisory firms in Singapore.

Yesterday Bloomberg reported that a consultation paper would be issued within the next two weeks.  The Bloomberg article is here.

This is welcome news as the Monetary Authority (who are the regulator in this instance) have already implemented a number of changes in the way that they process new entrants into the Singapore exempt regime and the consultation, and ultimately any changes, would be expected to level the playing field and provide a more certain regulatory outlook for all firms wanting to do run a business from Singapore.

Singapore has many strengths as a hub for asset management including its substantial private banking and wealth management industry, the presence of major sovereign wealth funds and a safe and pleasant working environment all wrapped up in a business friendly tax environment.

We look forward to a review of the proposed changes and, given the history of Singapore, we are confident that they will be pragmatic and attractive while maintaining adequate protections for those investors that need it.